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process guarantees may be desirable, particularly in the area of disciplinary expulsions from private universities. The "contract" approach which
has heretofore constituted the major obstacle seems today an anachronistic
characterization of the relationship between university and student, and
the "state action" argument is open to question in view of the complicated
financing of most private universities.
However, in general decisions dealing with the due process rights of
university students exemplify an enlightened judicial attitude toward the
function of the law in our complicated society. Due process by its very
nature precludes any mechanical application of a pre-determined formula
to every conceivable situation. In disciplinary matters, the issues involved
lend themselves more readily to the elaborate trappings of strict due
process. But a decent respect for society's interest in educational excellence dictates greater deference to the wisdom of trained professionals in
the strictly academic sphere, including the area of academic dismissals.
Because of the primacy of national educational goals, a continuing judicial
awareness of the dichotomy between academic and disciplinary matters
will be necessary if the courts are to meet adequately the challenge of
vindicating constitutional rights while respecting academic freedom.
M. Michele Fournet

TOWARD

A

MORE RATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
IN ANTITRUST LAW

The Michigan Public Service Commission, a state agency charged
with the regulation of public utilities, approved a tariff requiring Detroit
Edison, a public utility and sole distributor of electricity in southeast
Michigan, to administer a program of providing electric light bulbs to its
customers. Since the tariff included the cost of providing the light bulbs as
an element of its regular service, Detroit Edison billed its customers only
for the electricity consumed and did not separately charge for the light
bulbs. Petitioner, a merchant engaged in retail sale of light bulbs, sued
Detroit Edison asserting that the program allowed the utility to use its
protected monopoly position to restrain competition in the sale of light
bulbs and thus to violate the Sherman Act.' The Court of Appeals, citing
Parker v. Brown,2 found that Commission approval amounted to state
1.
2.

15 U.S.C. §§ I (1975); 2, 3 (1974); 4-7 (1970).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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action which immunized the program from federal antitrust law. A divided
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that a utility could incur
liability under the Sherman Act for anticompetitive conduct required by
state law when the state's policy is neutral regarding the conduct and the
conduct was initiated by the utility itself. Cantor v. DetroitEdison Co. , 96
S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
In the landmark decision of Parker v. Brown more than thirty years
prior to Cantor, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend the
Sherman Act to apply to action undertaken by a state "as an act of
government." 3 At least one of the justifications for the "state action
exemption" is deference to competing interests in the federal system:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attri4
buted to Congress.
Since the defendant in Parker was a state official, and the conduct in
question was a state program, the court's inquiry into the scope of the term
"state action" was superficial. The decision held only that a program that
"derived its authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the
state" was not the type of "business combination" prohibited by the
Sherman Act. 5 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court intimate that a
different result would follow should the state's participation be less active
than in the case under scrutiny. Clearly, Parker was not an attempt to
articulate a comprehensive scheme outlining the parameters of a "state
action exemption." 6
3. Id. at 352, citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1905). The term "state
action," when used in the context of the Sherman Act, should not be confused with
the same term used in the context of the fourteenth amendment of the United States

Constitution. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S.Ct. 3110, 3117 (1976). As
subsequent discussion will indicate, the scope of the term is narrower in the
antitrust context than in the civil rights cases.
4. 317 U.S. at 351 (1943).
5. Id. at 350-51. There was some question whether the program was inconsistent with federal law at all. The Court stated at one point that Congress contemplated such state programs when it passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937. Id. at 357.
6. In fact, the entire discussion of the applicability of the Sherman Act
appears to have been an afterthought prompted by the intervening decision of
Georgia v. Evans, 316 US. 159 (1942). The question was not even raised until
reargument in the United States Supreme Court. The Court dispensed with the
entire issue in only three pages of the twenty-one page opinion. Because of the
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The only distinct trend in judicial interpretation of the Parker exemption has been to limit its scope, with no general agreement on the basis of
such limitations. The decision itself contained two limitations on- state
antitrust immunity: (1) a state does not immunize private conduct which
violates the act by the mere assertion that such activity is lawful, 7 and (2) a
state which becomes part of a private agreement to restrain trade violates
the act.

8

The courts and commentators seem to agree that for conduct to enjoy
immunity it must be an act: (1) by a state in its capacity as sovereign; 9 and
(2) in furtherance of a legitimate local interest.10 Once judicial inquiry
ventures beyond these amorphous areas of consensus, there is a total lack
of agreement on how to reconcile the interests of federalism enunciated in
Parker with the interests of competition embodied in the Sherman Act.
The courts have limited the Parker exemption by inquiring into the
form and content of the State regulation with a rigor ostensibly unjustified
by the broad language of Parker. 1" One line of cases indicates that
immunity will be conferred on private action only if the activity is
adequately supervised by independent state officials. 12 Another group of
brevity of the discussion and the use of such broad, unqualified language as "state
action," the rationale of the exemption has prompted several interpretations. See
generally, Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, Parker v. Brown Revisited, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-19 (1972); Posner, The ProperRelationship Between
State Regulation and Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693 (1974); Slater,
Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69
Nw. L. REV. 71 (1974).
7. 317 U.S. at 351.
8. Id. at 351-52.
9. Thus excluding acts by a state in a private or proprietary capacity. See
Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), discussed in Slater, supra
note 6, at 89.
10. Excluding such state action as in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). In Schwegmann, Louisiana sought to compel activity
which federal law prohibited under the Miller-Tydings Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1975). The Court held that a state does not pursue a legitimate local concern when
-[i]t demands conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389.
11. One commentator noted, "[A]ctually, 'valid governmental action' states a
conclusion rather than a test and suggest inquiry rather than ends it .

. .

. General-

ly, the underlying issue in determining the applicability of such an exemption is the
degree of governmental involvement in, and supervision over, the allegedly wrong" Comment, Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec.
ful private activity ....
Cooperative: Rural Electrification and the Antitrust La ws-rresistible Force Meets
Immovable Object, 55 VA. L. REV. 325, 345-46 (1969).
12. Norman's on the Waterfront v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971);
Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); George Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
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cases requires that the regulatory statute clearly articulate an intent to
restrain trade in pursuance of a legitimate governmental goal. 3 Another
theory, represented by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 4 emphasizes that
the anticompetitive activity will not enjoy immunity unless it is compelled,
rather than merely authorized by state law.'

5

Rather than offering guidance for future resolution of such cases,
Cantor neither accepted nor rejected any of the earlier approaches, nor
could a majority agree on what elements would be necessary and sufficient
to invoke the Parkerexemption. Four separate opinions in the instant case
demonstrate a continuing lack of agreement by the Court on the scope of
the Parker exemption. The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Stevens,
was divided into four segments, only two of which enjoyed majority
approval. A majority of five justices emphasized that although the Michigan Public Service Commission is authorized to regulate the distribution
of electricity by specific legislative command, 16 no statute or commission
directive has ever expressed an intent to regulate the light bulb market.' 7
The Court noted ,that the light bulb program had been initiated long before
the state of Michigan began to regulate electric utilities' 8 and inferred that
the state policy was neutral on the desirability of the program. Nevertheless, state law required Detroit Edison to continue the program until
abandonment of the existing tariff by the Commission, a result which it
could attempt to provoke by filing such a request.
Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Lanier, 361 F. 2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Asheville
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 1959). See Slater,
supra note 6, at 91-109; Note, The State Action Exemption and Anti-trust Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 715, 723 (1976).
But see Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
252 (4th Cir. 1971) (mere silence by the appropriate regulatory agency could confer
Parkerimmunity).
13. Woods Exploration Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue
Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Slater, supra note 6, at 95.
14. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also United States v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 358 F.
Supp. 1224, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 1973); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 229, 233 (1976).

15. "It is not enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state
action; rather anticompetitive activity must be compelled by direction of the state
acting as sovereign." 421 U.S. at 791. The Court considered compulsion as a
"threshold inquiry" but did not intimate what additional elements might be necessary to invoke immunity. Id.
16. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.13(6) (1970).
17. 96 S. Ct. at 3113-14 (1976).
18. Id. at 3113. The program was initiated by the utility and/or its predecessors
in 1886. Michigan began regulating utilities in 1909. Id.
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The Court's analysis of the possible exemption of private conduct
required by state law raises two questions: (1) Is it fair to impose liability
on a citizen for violation of federal law when he is merely obeying the
command of his state?, and (2) Did Congress intend to superimpose
antitrust laws on an area of the economy already regulated by the state and
to impose regulations that might conflict with those of the state? The Court
decided that imposition of liability was fair by concluding that the decision
to continue the program was primarily that of Detroit Edison, and that
while the initiation of the program was a mixture of public and private
decision-making, the state role was not dominant. 9 The Court answered
the second question in the affirmative for three reasons. First, state
regulations and federal antitrust regulations will not necessarily be inconsistent. 20 Second and more important was the conclusion that "even
assuming inconsistency, we cannot accept the view that the federal interest
[must] inevitably be subordinated to the State's." 21 Finally, even if
Congress did not intend to impose antitrust laws on areas regulated by the
states, this case applies the laws to an unregulated area-the market for
light bulbs.
The remainder of Justice Stevens' opinion enjoyed the support of
only three other justices. The plurality narrowly interpreted the Parker
exemption as applying only to states or state officials, and not to those who
act as a result of state action. 22 In considering the fairness of imposing
treble damages on the defendant, the plurality concluded that "when
regulation merely takes the form of approval of a tariff proposed by the
company, it surely has not increased the company's risk of violating the
law." 23 Nor could Detroit Edison claim that it was led to believe that its
conduct was exempt from federal law since the court had never stated that
mere compulsion by state law conferred antitrust immunity.24
Chief Justice Burger concurred, stressing that since Michigan's policy toward the regulation of the light bulb market was neutral, neither
19. Id. at 3119. The Court noted that in another case the state's role in the
decision-making process might be so dominant that it would be unfair to impose
liability on one who merely obeys state law.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3117. A majority expressly rejected this interpretation; id. at 3123,
3128 n.5, 3129.
23.
Id. at 3121.
24. This conclusion seems to be justified in view of the Schwegmann decision.

The Court emphasized language in the Goldfarb opinion which states that the issue
of compulsion by state law is merely a "threshold inquiry." Id. See note 15, supra.

954
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federal nor state interest would be advanced by conferral of an exemption.
Justice Blackmun advocated a "rule of reason" approach, but concurred
in the judgment since the potential harms of state regulation here outweigh
the potential benefits.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented,
opining that the Goldfarb decision had established that the Parkerexemption extended to state-compelled activity.25 The dissent also cited legislative history in support of the contention that Congressional intent exemp26
ted such activity.
The Court's focus on whether the program was initiated by private
citizens seems misplaced. Beyond the problem of determining who actually initiates a program where both the state and private industry participate,
it may chill the input of information from the private sector to the public
sector because of the risk of exposure to antitrust liability. 27 The "initiation" test may even be inconsistent with Parker itself, since private
28
farmers played an essential role in the initiation of that program.
Continued reliance on the tests employed by the lower courts is also
unsatisfactory since they are all deficient in some respect. Cantor illustrates that adherence to the compulsion test may lead to improper results
since a state may inadvertently compel anticompetitive activity without
advancing a valid state interest. Moreover, Parker and Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp. indicate that a state may not confer immunity by
merely ordering its citizens to disobey the Sherman Act. 29 To conclude
30
otherwise would directly conflict with the supremacy clause.
The "adequate supervision" and "clear statutory intent" approaches
used by some lower courts are less offensive than the compulsion test, but
they do not go far enough. The fact that a state agency actively regulates
anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a manifest statutory command offers
no guarantee that such conduct is either necessary to achieve a legitimate
state goal or that the regulation adequately accommodates federal interests
in alleviating the evils of monopoly power. Like the compulsion test, these
25. 96 S. Ct. at 3132-33.
26.

Relying on floor debates and the House Report on the proposed act, Justice

Stewart concluded that Congress intended to exercise its greatest authority under
the Commerce Clause without interfering with the legislative authority of the states.
Id. at 3137.
27. 317 U.S. at 346 (1943). See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110,
3126 (Blackmun, J., concurring); cf. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
28. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943).
29. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 229, 236 (1976).
30. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
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analyses focus on only one half of the equation. They examine only the
form of the state regulation without regard to its content and completely
ignore federal interests which may predominate. Such tests irrebuttably
presume that any state policy interest, no matter how dubious its validity,
should prevail over the federal interest if the formal requirements are met.
Cantor apparently rejects this assumption in the enigmatic dictum to the
effect that when two regulatory interests conflict, the state interest need
not prevail. 31
Explication of the latter proposition, together with an examination of
the state's policy interest in the area subject to regulation, may lead to a
more thorough analysis of the possible antitrust exemption. Since there is
strong federal interest in avoiding the evils of monopoly, immunity from
antitrust laws should not be conferred unless the state establishes the need
for anticompetitive regulation to effectuate a legitimate state goal-a
burden not met in Cantor.3 2 Assuming a legitimate state goal, conflict
with the federal interest need not necessarily follow, and proper analysis
would attempt to render the goals complementary, not mutually exclu33
sive.
Should there be a conflict between federal and state interests,3 4 it is
submitted that a balancing test, similar to that suggested by Justice Blackmun in Cantor, is the best device to reconcile the federal interests in
competition with the state interest in anticompetitive regulation. 31 Whether
the program is adequately supervised or advances a legitimate state policy
are but two elements which would be considered in weighing the potential
harms and benefits of such a program. 36 The focus under this analysis is
31. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
32. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482,485 (1962) ("Immunity from antitrust laws
is not lightly to be conferred.").
33. Wood's Exploration Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
34. The initial inquiry is always whether there is a federal interest in competition in the area that the state seeks to regulate. The second question is whether the
interests conflict. In the area of distribution of electricity, there is no federal
interest in competition, since electric utilities are natural monopolies and competition could cause inadequate service and higher rates. There is, on the other hand, a
legitimate federal interest in competition in marketing light bulbs which conflicts
with the state-approved light bulb program.
35. 96 S. Ct. at 3124-28.
36. One possible criticism of this approach would be that the private citizen
who obeys anticompetitive state law would be in danger of incurring treble damages
if the courts later concluded that the federal interest in the area regulated is
paramount. The danger is more apparent than real since the citizen, such as Detroit
Edison, could seek declaratory judgment in federal court.
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properly placed on whether a valid state interest is advanced in the manner
least offensive to federal interests, accommodating each interest rather
than eliminating one or the other on the basis of a mechanical test.37
Such a balancing test is not without precedent. Dean Milk v. City of
Madison38 struck down health regulations which, though serving a legitimate state goal, effectively precluded interstate competition in the milk
market and were therefore unduly offensive to the Commerce Clause. The
Court emphasized that there were many less offensive alternatives available which would effectuate the same policy goal. 39 Polar Ice Co. v.
Andrews,40 another Commerce Clause case, employed a similar balancing
test to invalidate a local health measure which restricted competition from
out of state. There is no reason why the applicability of the balancing
approach should be limited to Commerce Clause cases when the relevant
inquiry there, as here, is the extent to which legitimate state regulation
41
must interfere with competition.
The decision in Cantor would have been the same under this approach, albeit for different reasons. Employing a balancing test, the Court
would have concluded, as did Justice Blackmun, that there was a conflict
of federal and state interests in the regulation of the light bulb market and
that the federal interest in competition is paramount. The decision of the
Court and the various lower court approaches to the problem again indicate that a continued reliance on a few broad statements in Parkerdoes not
provide a sufficient analytical framework to determine the scope of the
state action exemption. Hopefully, the Court's inquiry into the state policy
to be effectuated, and the statement that federal interest need not be
overridden by conflicting state interest foreshadows a move toward the
balancing test as a substitute for the vague standard provided in Parker.
Jerry Harper
37. See Posner, supra note 6, at 707; Slater, supra note 6, at 104. Accommodating competing interests requires an inquiry beyond a determination of which inter-

est is paramount. If the balance of interests favors the state regulation, accommodation requires the further consideration of whether the state interest is effectuated
in a manner least offensive to the federal interest. Thus, a court that employs the
balancing test might consider alternative methods by which the state could achieve
the same policy goal. See Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951),
discussed in the text at note 38, infra.
38.

340 U.S. 349 (1951).

39. Id. at 354-56.
40. 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
41. See Slater, supra note 6, at 107-08. The tests used in PolarIce and Dean
Milk would seem particularly appropriate in an antitrust context since the Sherman
Act is an expression of Congressional intent authorized by the Commerce Clause.

